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The Event
On 17 May 1991, the Fifth Channel of Leningrad television broadcast its popular program Piatoe koleso (The Fifth Wheel)-an episode that has since become one of the most notorious media events of the past two decades. The Fifth Channel acquired prestige during the period of perestroika reform, when it was broadcast nationally. Its programs concerned historical and cultural events in the Soviet past and present and were watched by an audience of several million viewers. Sergei Sholokhov, one of the hosts of The Fifth Wheel, had the reputation of being a young, dynamic, and pathbreaking journalist.
On that day, he began the program with the following words: "Today we are opening the Wheel with a new rubric. It is called 'Sensations and hypotheses.' I will host it together with Sergei Kurekhin, a famous political fi gure and movie actor." 1 Kurekhin sat next to Sholokhov, behind a large desk in a scholarly looking offi ce lined with bookshelves. A few years later, he would become a national celebrity, but at the time of the program he was unknown to most viewers. Kurekhin began to speak: "The goal of this rubric will be to introduce absolutely new approaches to well-known historical events in our country and the whole world, to well-known facts." The fi rst program, he announced, would concern "the central mystery of the October [Bolshevik] revolution," a mystery that had "always remained," despite all our apparent knowledge of the event.
During the next hour, speaking in a serious scholarly tone and displaying historical photographs, documentary footage, fi lm clips, and interviews with scientists, Kurekhin put forward a remarkable thesis on the origins of the Bolshevik revolution. He began by admitting that it was hardly surprising that the revolution had "inspired whole generations of The epigraph is taken from Michel Serres, The Parasite, trans. Lawrence R. Schehr (Baltimore, 1982), 63 -64. 1. For this analysis I used a video-recording of the original program that aired on 17 May 1991. This original differs substantially from the video-recorded version that Sholokhov made available for purchase in 1996 under the title Lenin-grib (Lenin mushroom). The latter version is shorter than the original (32 minutes instead of 70), substantially re-edited, and augmented with additional materials and interviews, including a part of the program that was not originally aired, in which Kurekhin and Sholokhov break their serious tone and start laughing. It is video clips from this later re-edited version that are available today on YouTube.
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munist revolution, about whom public criticism and irony had always been taboo, the claim itself became even more believable. Had Kurekhin been speaking of anyone else, his words would easily have been dismissed as a joke. But Lenin! How could one joke about Lenin? Especially on Soviet television. Audiences could not help but attribute some credibility to the revelation.
During the broadcast, which lasted over an hour, the audience received no explanation of whether this was an ironic prank or a serious program. Millions of television viewers found themselves at a loss: some were completely confused about the program; others recognized the extreme irony of stiob but were stunned that such a genre could be performed on television and, moreover, that it could be directed at Lenin; and still others took the program at face value and were shaken by its iconoclastic revelations. 4 When the program ended, the studio was overwhelmed with phone calls from viewers-some wanting an explanation, some protesting, and some laughing. 5 Even educated and well-informed members of the intelligentsia were confused. The actor Konstantin Raikin, a member of Moscow's theatrical circles and an accomplished comedian himself, later described his reaction to the broadcast: "I took it as any normal Soviet person who was accustomed to trusting serious conversations [in the media would have] I was absolutely sold." Although he may not necessarily have "bought" the claim that Lenin was a mushroom, he certainly did not instantly recognize it as a hoax. In retrospect, he fi nds this astonishing: "Every one of us thinks that he is not a fool and is able to recognize a sham, so to speak, when he is being taken for a ride." Those who are comedians should presumably recognize such hoaxes with an even greater ease. And yet, Raikin, who had never heard of Kurekhin before that moment, failed to recognize his provocation. Another famous viewer, the singer Alla Pugacheva, also claimed to have taken the program seriously: "I was asking everyone: did you hear that? Did you watch that program?!" 6 Perhaps the words of these celebrities should be taken with a grain of salt. These quotes, after all, come from a special 1996 program that Sholokhov broadcast in memory of Kurekhin, who had tragically died that summer. So although the comedian and singer did admit that they were fooled by the hoax, we must remember that Sholokhov had a particular interest in presenting evidence of such. If his program had indeed fooled many people, it would demonstrate that he, its host, was, in 1991, already more enlightened and ironic than the majority of viewers. Sholokhov has, 4. On stiob, see Alexei Yurchak, "Gagarin and the Rave Kids: Transforming Power, Identity, and Aesthetics in the Post-Soviet Nightlife," in Adele Marie Barker, ed., Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and Society since Gorbachev (Durham, 1999) The next day after the broadcast Galina Barinova, the chief for ideology at the [Leningrad] Regional Party Committee, was visited by a delegation of Bolshevik veterans, who demanded that she explain to them whether it was true that Lenin was a mushroom. "No!" Galina Barinova emphatically replied. "But how can this be," protested the veterans, "if yesterday they said so on the television?" To which she replied: "This is untrue," adding a phrase that put me and Kurekhin in a state of shock: "Because a mammal cannot be a plant." 7 Sholokhov's claim to have fooled the gullible public, especially the Bolshevik veterans, seems suspiciously self-serving. It remains true, however, that at the time of the program's original broadcast, most people did not recognize it as a hoax, even if they did not necessarily take its central claim at face value. Moreover, the program turned out to be such a remarkable event that today, almost twenty years later, it is still widely remembered in Russia as one of the fi rst illustrations that the Soviet system was crumbling.
Several important questions come to mind. Why did this provocation happen when it did? Why did it focus on Lenin? How exactly was it performed? What was funny about it to some people, not funny to others, and confusing to yet others? What were the social, cultural, and political effects of this provocation at the time of the broadcast and in the subsequent years? And fi nally, can the answers to these questions provide us with a new perspective on the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, more broadly, on the relationship between politics and irony?
The Open
Kurekhin was involved in many activities. A brilliant and versatile pianist, improviser, and composer, he started playing with informal bands in Leningrad in the mid-1970s, exploring a diversity of styles, from avantgarde jazz to punk rock (fi gure 1). 8 In the 1980s, he famously created and led Pop-Mekhanika-a multifarious musical orchestra and performance group, which brought together diverse styles and genres and united characters from a variety of offi cial, informal, and amateur cultural scenes. Rock guitarists performed with classical opera singers, ballet dancers, boys' choirs, avant-garde fashion models, free jazz saxophonists, characters from strange local "scenes," and sometimes even animals (a scared fl ock of geese gaggling to pulsating music or a startled horse, which once, to everyone's joy, began pissing on stage). Kurekhin conducted this motley crew by running, jumping, waving his arms, and shouting commands. The resulting sound and spectacle were extremely unusual but surprisingly well organized. 9 Performances of Pop-Mekhanika acquired a cult status among connoisseurs, but Kurekhin remained unknown to wider audiences. By the early 1990s, his activities had broadened beyond music: he published articles, wrote scripts and music for fi lms in which he also acted, directed theater plays, and hosted radio and television programs. 10 The televised Lenin hoax was the fi rst of his projects to have an audience of several million viewers. How, one might ask, was it possible for Kurekhin to conduct such a daring hoax within the state-controlled national media?
In order for the hoax to work, an unusual combination of political, social, and cultural elements had to come together. This type of televised provocation can only succeed under certain circumstances-before the provocateur becomes widely known and recognized, before the audience comes to expect this unusual genre of irony on television, and before important political ideals become common objects of public irony. In the case of Russia, a program of this kind could only have been successful during the limited historical window of the early 1990s. Earlier, the media was too tightly controlled by the Soviet party-state; television programs had to be preapproved, and any irony at the expense of the political foundations would have been impossible. Although this control had weakened by the fi nal years of perestroika, it had not completely disappeared. Later, in the post-Soviet 1990s, although irony about the Soviet system had become common, the media ultimately fell under new forms of control: the new political system and its newly introduced market considerations. The early to mid-1990s, it is now clear, marked the beginning of a short and peculiar period of suspense, when the old forms of control, regulation, and governance were being weakened or broken, and the new ones had not yet emerged or stabilized. During that short period of "the open," squeezed between the Soviet past and the post-Soviet future, popular mass media, including cultural programs on television, experienced unprecedented and unexpected freedoms. 11 Film director Sergei Debizhev, who worked with Kurekhin on several projects, described the atmosphere in Russian cinema and television during those years in almost utopian terms: "At that time it was possible to do whatever you wanted without asking anybody or saying anything to anyone." 12 Although Debizhev's words may be tinted with nostalgic exaggeration, the short period they describe was certainly unique in its relative lack of predetermined control. 13 Sholokhov claims that during that period he was able to choose the topics for The Fifth Wheel with relative freedom. He needed only to obtain the "air signature" (efi rnaia podpisЈ) of Bella Kurkova, his boss at the Fifth Channel, to approve a topic for broadcast. By 1991, Kurkova usually approved any topic, as long as Sholokhov assured her that it did not deal with Boris ElЈtsin, who at the time was still an ousted member of the Politburo. When Sholokhov proposed Kurekhin as his guest for a program on history, Kurkova provided her air signature "without even looking." 14 She also let him choose the length of his different programs, saying: "SeriozhenЈka, if you want, take two hours of air time. There will be no one else after you." According to Sholokhov this free indeterminacy, which "cannot even be imagined on television today," ended in the mid-1990s, with the privatization of television and the emergence of strict "programming formats, such as 26 minutes, 52 minutes," and so on. 15 Kurekhin's televised provocation was one of the earliest manifestations of this unusual, and short-lived, period of suspended political and economic constraints. At the end of perestroika, despite the changes in the media and the growing critique of the Soviet political system, most viewers were still prepared to accept serious programs on television at face value. Contrary to the common assertion that Soviet people did not trust Soviet media and always read between the lines, the mass media, especially television (in particular its programs concerning science and culture) actually received phenomenal trust and respect. During perestroika, the public's trust in serious media only increased, with new journalistic programs achieving unprecedented popularity. Indeed, it was the popular new genre of investigatory journalism that Kurekhin chose to imitate, skillfully playing with his audience's expectations.
Visual Documentation
To make his outrageous claim appear plausible, Kurekhin had to present evidence that seemed credible. Sholokhov later recalled: "It was crucial that one loved assembling a body of evidence. Our viewers are extremely scrupulous. Every idea must be substantiated in practice, not only in theory . . . one needs to provide corroborating documents. And Kurekhin found lots of artifacts to support his thesis." 16 These artifacts included historical photographs; documentary footage; quotes from letters, books, and memoirs; and interviews with real scientists. When presenting these materials, Kurekhin tried to divert the viewers' attention away from the truth or falsity of his main claim (that Lenin was a mushroom), focusing instead on the smaller, unrelated question of whether each of the presented documents, photographs, or scientifi c facts was credible.
It was also important that the hoax be broadcast on television. In other forms of media-magazine articles, radio programs, or live lectures-it would have been next to impossible to pull it off. The televised format offered Kurekhin many visual techniques to convince viewers that his claims could be trusted. Among these, of course, was his skilled performance as an actor. Kurekhin's behavior in front of the camera never once betrayed his agenda; his apparent sincerity was buttressed by extremely articulate and learned speech, a genuine tone of voice, and candid stares directed at the camera. This effect was amplifi ed by the physical setting of the program: the scholarly offi ce, its large desk, shelves full of books, and stacks of folders and paper (fi gure 2).
If Kurekhin had presented his visual evidence in a published text, the hoax would have been more readily apparent. The temporalities of reading text and watching television are different: readers can reread passages and study photographs, while viewers of real-time broadcasts are far more constrained. Kurekhin used these constraints to his advantage. He displayed his historical photographs and documentary footage for only a fl eeting moment, quickly replacing one example with the next, and providing assertive commentary about its supposed meaning. His barrage of fast-paced visual evidence and verbal narrative was designed to overload the viewers' perception, making it more diffi cult for them to contemplate 16. Ibid. the literal content of each image or to question the claims made on its behalf.
In his essay, "The Photographic Message," Roland Barthes argues that documentary photographs are unique among other forms of visual representation, such as drawings, paintings, cinema, theater, and artistic photography. Whereas each of those forms provides only an interpretation of reality, the documentary photograph can function as reality's direct, uninterpreted, refl ection or "analogon." 17 Documentary photography is, of course, not devoid of subjective interpretation (by the photographer, editor, or publisher) but, as Barthes stressed, its interpretations are always dependent upon, and ultimately hidden behind, the photograph's irreducible character as reality's refl ection. Every documentary photograph, therefore, incorporates a "structural paradox," for it is simultaneously an objective refl ection of reality and a subjective interpretation of it. The concomitant "ethical paradox," therefore, is that by manipulating a documentary photograph, one directly manipulates the truth. 18 In presenting his fake evidence, Kurekhin was skillfully drawing on these structural and ethical paradoxes inherent in documentary photography and footage.
Kurekhin fi rst showed a photograph that supposedly linked Lenin with Mexico (fi gure 3). He provided the following commentary:
Let us take this photograph. Look. This is Lenin with a group of his comrades. Look carefully. Some of them you know, others you do not. Notice that if we draw a certain structure, taking IlЈich [Lenin] as its top and then identifying fi ve points-this is the fi rst point, second point, third, fourth, and fi fth, fi ve points-and then connecting them into one whole, then what will we get? We will get a star. . . . A fi ve-pointed star with one elongated section, the same kind of star that is found on almost all Mexican shrines.
He then quickly moved on to the next piece of evidence. What did this short display achieve? The photograph was genuine, and easily recogniz-17. Roland Barthes,"The Photographic Message," in Susan Sontag, ed., A Barthes Reader (New York, 1982), 196, 197. 18. As attested by numerous historical precedents of doctoring photographs.
S5588.indb 314 S5588.indb 314 5/2/11 1:01:19 PM 5/2/11 1:01:19 PM able as such by the viewers. Such photographs of Lenin and his comrades were ubiquitous in Soviet history books, documentary fi lms, and museums. The interpretation that accompanied the photograph, however, was fake. There are no "fi ve points" on the picture that could be identifi ed and connected, but rather many faces, far more than fi ve, and none of them stands out as a point. The star that Kurekhin traced was completely arbitrary, but because he showed the picture at such a sharp angle and narrated its description with such speed, this was impossible for the viewers to determine. The recognizable picture and its confi dent description produced a general sense of authenticity and importance, although what it all meant remained unclear or dubious. In truth, this documentary photograph had been "doctored"-not in its internal pictorial structure but through the manner of its perception and visibility. Kurekhin's procedure emphasized a general sense of authenticity, while deemphasizing the concrete "fact" that claimed to be authentic. How the evidence was presented was more important than what was literally depicted. Kurekhin, leaving no time for contemplation, moved on to a second example: another well-known photograph of Lenin, sitting at the desk in his Kremlin offi ce. Before showing this photograph, Kurekhin provided a commentary full of specialized terms-all of which, although real, would have been largely unfamiliar to most viewers. Continuing his previous discussion of hallucinogenic cacti in which he had mentioned Lophophora Williamsii, he now introduced several more scientifi c terms (such as Turbinicarpus, melocactus, cephalium) and "facts" that he left unexplained. Kurekhin seemed to be leading to an extremely important revelation, and with a genuine scholarly enthusiasm, fi nally declared: "But there is something strange about Lophophora and Turbinicarpus-they do not have cephalium. 19 Only melocactus has cephalium, certain types of 19. Cephalium, from Greek kefali (head)-a real term describing a fl at, round, woolen or bristly "head" at the top of a cactus, from Dictionary: Botanical and Technical Terminology at www.cactus-art.biz/note-book/Dictionary/Dictionary_C/dictionary_C.htm (last accessed 15 March 2011). melocactus and certain types of discocactus. Therefore, this means thatwell, let me explain it to make it clearer for you." After this introduction, he produced a photograph that most viewers would easily recognize (fi gures 4 and 5):
Take a look. This is a photograph of Lenin in his offi ce. Look here, you see? None of the researchers have paid attention to this strange object situated next to the inkstand. You see, it has a small top. . . . It is an astonishing fact that Lenin-the person on whom millions of monographs are focused, every day of whose life and work is researched-and yet all scholars and researchers failed to pay attention to this strange object. However, it is present on almost all photographs of Lenin at his offi ce. Look, it is here, next to the inkstand.
Kurekhin showed the picture for only a short moment before quickly replacing it with several different photographs of Lenin's desk, each with the same white cylinder. Then he said: "I want to explain what this is. This is reminiscent of, or rather, at fi rst it seemed to me that this object is reminiscent of a melocactus with cephalium at the top." Instead of explaining the meaning of this statement, Kurekhin started providing more complex terms and fi ctionalized facts to distract the viewers: "Why cephalium develops in the melacactus is still an enigma. Its function remains unclear. 20 Suddenly, for no apparent reason, a woolen hat starts growing on the top of a cactus slowly covering it up. Lophophora Williamsii, which we discussed earlier, does not have this woolen hat. But Turbinicarpus, which is an intermediary stage between Lophophora and melocactus, already possesses emerging elements of cephalium. You understand, right?" Building up the viewers' expectations, Kurekhin delivered his fi nal point: "The object that is located on Lenin's desk is highly reminiscent of Turbinicarpus in the condition in which its hallucinogenic qualities are manifested." According to Kurekhin, in other words, this object established a direct 20. Needless to say, Kurekhin exploited the ignorance of most viewers about such issues. In fact, the function of the cephalium is well known-this is where "fl ower buds and fruits are formed" in a cactus. Once again, Soviet viewers easily recognized the fi lm clips as genuine documentary footage of Lenin. The speed with which the clips were shown, however, left no time to consider the validity of Kurekhin's interpretation. If we watch the footage more carefully this interpretation appears obviously false. Instead of featuring "the same boy" standing next to Lenin, each fragment depicts Lenin with completely different groups of people, some without boys altogether. The last clip-with which Kurekhin concluded: "You see? The very same boy"-actually showed Lenin standing next to a man and a woman (fi gure 6). 
An Interview with a Mycologist
In addition to the documentary photographs and footage of Lenin, Kurekhin aired prerecorded interviews with real scientists, who, unaware of the claims that he would make in the program, had provided serious expert commentary. One interview was with a scientist from Komarov Botanical Institute in St. Petersburg, whom Sholokhov introduced as follows: "I decided to check Sergei Kurekhin's theory and to interview a specialist. This is Aleksandr Eliseevich Kovalenko, a scientist specializing in mushrooms." Dressed in a white robe, Kovalenko stood in the middle of a laboratory packed with equipment and glass jars, looking extremely self-conscious in front of the camera-all of which added scholarly authenticity to his words (fi gure 7).
SHOLOKHOV: Tell us please whether macro-mushrooms, as well as micromushrooms, possess any narcotic qualities. KOVALENKO: Well, as a specialist in macro-mushrooms, I will speak only about them. So, yes, they possess such qualities. This interview, although conducted with a genuine scientist, had nothing to do with Lenin. Like the previous visual documents, it provided a general air of authenticity without explicitly addressing Kurekhin's extraordinary claims.
Ironic and Artistic Genres
The most remarkable feature of Kurekhin's performance, then, was his convincing defense of a clearly absurd thesis by creatively supporting it with genuinely authentic documents, facts, and opinions. While Kurekhin invented many elements of this creative tactic himself, he also drew on an existing informal artistic tradition that emerged during the late Soviet period. It was within this tradition that Kurekhin had come of age as an artist, musician, and provocateur in Leningrad in the 1970s and 1980s. A central element of this tradition was ironic "overidentifi cation" with the authoritative symbols and meanings of the state-the ironic style that was sometimes referred to as stiob. 21 Among other things, this meant making false claims with an air of utmost sincerity and without visible irony. In overidentifi cation, unlike other genres of irony, it is hard to differentiate between the assertions made seriously and the assertions made ironically. This genre became particularly widespread during late socialism in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (and, in the past ten years, has emerged in U.S. political culture and media as well). 22 In every instance, the irony of overidentifi cation is directed at the formal organization, rhetorical style, and conventions of presentation in the dominant authoritative discourse. Soviet authoritative discourse during perestroika was characterized by its obsession with disclosing the previously unknown facts of Soviet history, ostensibly for the purpose of ridding real socialism of its alleged distortions. Kurekhin's televised provocation may be described as an overidentifi cation with this discourse of disclosure. 23. Kurekhin's wife, Anastasia, later remembered that although he thought about faking perestroika media for a while, there was an immediate model on which he based his television appearance. A few months earlier he had watched a serious television program according to which newly discovered facts about the death of the poet Sergei Esenin suggested that he was killed, rather than committed suicide as was commonly believed. In the program this claim was "based on completely absurd facts. Kurekhin also drew from the related informal artistic genre that Boris Groys has called, "art documentation." Art documentation is not the creation of artworks per se, but the development of elaborate documents, descriptions, accounts, and other forms of evidence about real or imaginary events. 24 Groys associates this genre, which emerged among Soviet informal art groups in the 1970s and 1980s, with the "Collective Action Group" (Gruppa "Kollektivnye deistviia"), whose activities "took place outside Moscow with only the members of the group and a few invited guests present." These activities were "made accessible to a wider audience only through documentation, in the form of photographs and texts." 25 These documents, however, were never accompanied by an explanation of what the events meant or what the participants thought. 26 Kurekhin would have been familiar with parallel developments of this genre that emerged in Leningrad during the same time. The "Necrorealists," for example, organized absurd actions in suburban forests. Their live events were only open to group members; documentary footage was later publicly exhibited in private apartments. Members of the group never explained why they carried out these events and why they meticulously documented them. 27 Another group, the "MitЈki," focused on developing strange lifestyles and everyday rituals to problematize the boundary between life and art. Their activities were also known publicly only through the documentary writings and drawings about their lives that members of the group circulated. 28 These documented lifestyles-in texts, photographs, documentary footage, and other forms of evidence-interfered with the Soviet everyday, creating strange and often inexplicable distortions within it. Although the documents did not address the purpose of these actions, and although these actions did not fi t into traditional understandings of political opposition, they nevertheless worked to displace the very defi nition of what constituted a political identity in the Soviet state. Kurekhin was not only familiar with these groups (and others like them) but had actually collaborated with them on several projects (particularly in Pop-Mekhanika). His televised hoax was informed by this established genre of art documentation.
At the same time, however, there was an important difference between Kurekhin Because of these unique features, Kurekhin's provocation was able to interfere with historical reality with the kind of force that the genre of art documentation could never achieve. This was not a mere art project but a full-scale public hoax that actually fooled or confused many people. To understand it, therefore, it is crucial to compare it, not only with experimental art practices, but also with public hoaxes and forgeries more broadly.
Provenance
A curious case of art forgery, which took place at about the same time in England, provides a particularly useful point of comparison. In the early 1990s, the international art world was shaken by the discovery of an art forgery masterminded by the English con man John Drewe. This forgery was unprecedented in both its immense scale-hundreds of fake works by Alberto Giacometti, Marc Chagall, Jean Dubuffet, Ben Nicholson, Georges Braque, and Nicolas de Staël were sold through respectable art auctions for a decade-and its method. While most art forgers produce perfect imitations of well-known masterpieces, Drewe produced original pictures of unremarkable quality, claiming that they were the previously unknown works of great masters. These mediocre pictures were then accompanied by perfect provenance-documentation of the pictures' origin and history. Instead of focusing on the internal quality of the paintings, Drewe focused on the external quality of their documentation. He forged not artwork, but paperwork. To prepare a perfect provenance, Drewe composed elaborate decadespanning correspondences between people who had never existed, receipts for sales of these nonexistent pictures between different countries and family estates, beautiful art catalogs for exhibitions that never took place, and records of counterfactual restoration work. These perfectly crafted documents were not only presented to art dealers, but also secretly planted into the records of prominent archives and museum collectionsLondon's Tate Gallery, the Institute of Contemporary Art, the National Art Library, the Victoria and Albert Museum.
The fake canvases themselves were actually quite mediocre. The artist who painted them for Drewe worked quickly, sloppily, and using cheap vinyl paints instead of genuine expensive oils. This alone could have been easily detected, if the art experts had only bothered to check. The perfect provenances rendered the intrinsic quality of the accompanying mediocre canvases relatively invisible and fooled an army of experts, critics, and Slavic Review auctioneers into authenticating them. 29 After Drewe's con was discovered, the director of the Tate Gallery admitted to having personally authenticated two of the fake works (supposedly by Nicholson) "not because the pictures were good-in fact, the general consensus was that they were unimpressive at best-but because the provenancing was fl awless." 30 Other reputable academics authenticated the pictures based on the falsifi ed pieces of evidence that had been placed in the archives. Before Drewe's scam, an art expert commented, "the security in archives and libraries focused on preventing valuables being taken out; there wasn't corresponding diligence to prevent stuff coming in." 31 By seeding perfectly faked documentation among genuine archival data, Drewe brought hundreds of previously nonexistent "masterpieces" to life. His, however, was more than a criminal scam, for it ultimately exposed a hidden principle at work in the contemporary western art world-that the value of a work of art is not necessarily rooted in its intrinsic quality. This refl ects the provocative claim that Michel Foucault made in his essay, "What Is an Author?" For a work to be recognized as genuine art, Foucault argued, it must be positioned within a certain "index of reality"-the modern system of classifi cation that defi nes the work in terms of external documentation and cultural conventions. 32 One element in this index is the author's "name," which in this case refers not only to the actual person who produced the work but also to the "cultural space" within which the work can be recognized as art, and outside of which cannot. 33 What Drewe skillfully forged was not art per se but an "index of reality" for the late capitalist art market, with which he could transform unknown mediocre drawings into outstanding artworks.
In this way, Drewe's forgery is similar to Kurekhin's hoax. Taken on its own, Kurekhin's statement that Lenin was a mushroom sounds irrational and absurd. In retrospect, it seems baffl ing, even ridiculous that anyone could have been confused by it. Kurekhin's audiences thought the claim appeared plausible, however, not because they were gullible enough to believe it, but because, like Drewe, Kurekhin had directed their attention away from the "intrinsic quality" (literal meaning) of the statement and onto the fl awlessness of the documents (provenance) supporting the statement. Both Kure khin and Drewe slipped fake evidence into genuine archival materials. Kurekhin's hoax, like Drewe's, also exposed a hidden cultural principle-the fact that in Soviet state and media discourse, a proposition could be accepted as factual, not because of its intrinsic quality (its literal meaning, the falsifi ability of its argument, how plausible it sounded), but because it had been articulated in an authoritative form that, although "external" to the proposition's literal meaning, could mark it as belonging to the space of unquestionable facts. There was, however, also a crucial difference between the two hoaxes. Whereas Drewe's goal was to fool both the experts and the general public, and ideally to never have the con discovered, Kurekhin actually intended his hoax to be discovered and later to produce laughter that could expose something important about the Soviet system in 1991.
What, then, exactly did his provocation expose? And why have its political and ludic effects continued to resonate over the past twenty years? To answer these questions, we must fi rst contextualize the event within Kurekhin's broader aesthetic and political project. What other activities did he pursue in this vein? How did he understand them? How did others react to them?
The Other
In the 1980s, Kurekhin was known mostly in the informal artistic milieus of Leningrad and Moscow. After his Lenin-mushroom hoax, however, he was famous nationally and could pursue grander and more daring experiments. In 1995, Kurekhin publicly announced his support for Aleksandr Dugin, the ideologue of the extreme nationalist Eurasionism movement (Evraziistvo), who argued that Russia's cultural, political, and religious identity made it incompatible with western liberalism. 34 The liberal intelligentsia was extremely hostile to Dugin's ideas, and Kurekhin knew it. In the fall of 1995, he convinced Dugin to move from Moscow to St. Petersburg and to run for a seat in the Duma. He promised to help Dugin in organizing his election campaign, participated with him in several meetings with prospective voters, and organized a Pop-Mekhanika performance entitled "Kurekhin dlia Dugina" (Kurekhin for Dugin) (fi gure 8).
The reaction of artists, intellectuals, and journalists to these activities was mixed. Some criticized Kurekhin, others defended him, and most were completely confused about his intentions. Was Kurekhin seriously promoting Dugin's nationalistic ideas or was he ridiculing them? Generating this kind of uncertainty in his audience was an important aspect of Kurekhin's work more broadly; he cultivated it as part of his aesthetic and political project. This is part of the reason why Kurekhin and his project have always been diffi cult to describe. The fi lm director Vladimir Nepevnyi, who collected hundreds of hours of documentary footage from Kurekhin's interviews and performances for the 2003 documentary Kurekhin concluded: "he never spoke in an open and straightforward way, in his personal voice, not hiding behind his dead irony. A certain character was always speaking instead of him. . . . This was always some provocation. This is why our idea [of showing the real Kurekhin] was quite risky and not easy to achieve. I literally had to look for microscopic fragments . . . where he appeared to the viewer without his usual masks." 35 Nepevnyi, who did not know Kurekhin personally, assumed that behind Kurekhin's performance he would fi nd a different "real" person. That this different person never quite emerges in the documentary, however, suggests that Nepevnyi may have been mistaken. Most artists and intellectuals who knew and collaborated with Kurekhin claim that, although he was a genius, it is indeed diffi cult to explain what he did and who he was. One commentator in a popular weekly magazine wrote: "Every judgment of Kurekhin as a musician, composer, arranger, creator of 'Pop-Mekhanika' is inaccurate. . . . When you faced Kurekhin you instantly faced a problem: Who is he? How to defi ne him, even in terms of his own occupation? What was his occupation?" 36 One literary critic agreed: "Maybe he was a genius composer, maybe a thinker-provocateur, maybe a mad showman. Each of these hypotheses, and all of them taken together, are still far from the truth." 37 Even the fi lm director Debizhev, with whom Kurekhin worked on several projects, enigmatically insisted that he "was neither a musician, nor an actor, nor a thinker. He was Kurekhin." 38 The words of another fi lm director, Sergei Ovcharov, seemed to summarize these impressions: "Sergei was an enigma, and those who claim they know him are mistaken." 39 Many people have described Kurekhin in terms of some radical otherness-as a saint, a madman, a man from the future, or even an extraterrestrial. As a musical biography once argued: "Due to some anomalous mistake Kurekhin was born not in his era. He should have been born some time in the third or fourth millennium, when everyone will be as beautiful and intelligent as he is." 40 Sholokhov himself recalled that, "When you faced Kurekhin you faced something divine. A young god descended to Earth, and we were lucky to have met him." 41 The artist Viktor Tikhomirov went one step further, writing: "If we allow that extraterrestrials may live among us, then Sergei Kurekhin was one of them. Extraterrestrial origin is the best explanation of the unusual nature of his charm. . . . When he entered a room, everyone realized that before that moment their life was not life. . . . When he called you on the phone, the call always came as if from a different planet. Everything interested him acutely. Regular human traits expanded in him beyond the limits of the possible. He is an extraterrestrial. He comes to learn and understand, not to keep his distance." 44 When Kurekhin died unexpectedly in July 1996, at age 42, his death itself produced similar reactions. It seemed uncannily fi tting that Kurekhin's death was not only unexpected but also caused by an extremely rare disease, cardiac sarcoma (cancer of the heart). As a commentator in a popular monthly wrote: this disease "happens either once in a hundred 37 accuracy and inventive imagination that allowed the sped up material to become such a phenomenon; a lesser musician would have undoubtedly been dismissed as a charlatan." 52 An American music critic reviewing the same anniversary edition, however, wrote: "Originally released in 1981, this historic recording created controversy both inside and outside the Soviet Union . . . and no-the tapes have not been sped up-this is the ridiculous speed that Sergey excels in!" 53 Kurekhin's otherness has been compared to that of the traditional Russian fi gure known as the iurodivyi (holy fool). 54 Although some elements of his style can indeed be traced to this cultural trope, others are distinctly late-Soviet and therefore the overall effect is quite unique. A recent cultural history described the ethical position of the medieval iurodivye as "monologic," "fi rmly authoritarian," and infused with a sense of superiority. By breaking social norms, iurodivye demonstrated that there existed another, absolute truth to which they alone had access. 55 Kurekhin's position was different: he did not believe in absolute truth let alone in the idea of having unique access to it. He approached every truth with "interest, curiosity, distance," as Mazin described. This tactic has fi rm roots in the late Soviet period, when it was practiced by many members of the last Soviet generation, especially within informal artistic milieus. The approach affected not only their artistic style but also their senses of self-as ones in a position of otherness toward political and ethical truths as such. 56 Elsewhere I have termed this position the politics of indistinction. 57 This is precisely the position that Kurekhin cultivated as an artist and sometimes explained.
Parasite
Although it would be wrong to accept Kurekhin's words about himself at face value, it would be equally wrong to dismiss them outright. In speaking about himself, Kurekhin combined serious commentary about his work with the provocative improvisation that was a part of his work. Any conversation with Kurekhin Kurekhin continued: "What I do is something different-it is a form of parasitising on an existing archetype. This is precisely what I doparasitising. I am a parasite. And also a bastard, a cretin, and a piece of shit." These last words were added with a chuckle, to distance himself from didactic seriousness, but his analysis was anything but a joke. Kurekhin added: "I would like to introduce the word parasite as a new term." Indeed, this term proves remarkably precise in describing the politics of his aesthetic method. Kurekhin explained: "A parasite is ambivalent. Being a parasite vis-à-vis a system means, on the one hand, possessing a structure that is completely independent of the system, but, on the other hand, being part of the system, feeding off it. . . . Parasitizing is like looking deep into things-not negating, ridiculing, or judging them, but making visible their internal criteria." Kurekhin suggested that the relation of the parasite to the organism, or system, that it inhabits goes beyond the binary opposition between being a part of something and being an external intruder. Instead, their relationship is symbiotic: the parasite forces the system to change in order to accommodate or expel it. As Michel Serres famously pointed out, in French the word parasite has three distinct meanings-social parasite, biological parasite, and noise or interference (within a channel of communication is not a chance linguistic occurrence, for the three concepts are actually linked semantically. Consider the meaning of parasite as noise in the channel of communication. In the usual understanding of communication, noise is an unwanted interference in an otherwise clear connection between sender and receiver. Serres argues, however, that noise is actually more complex. Because a communicated message always passes through a medium, we could also say that it passes through noise (from static white noise to mishearings, mistellings, rumors, and so on). Noise, therefore, plays an important constitutive role in communication. This can be extended to the other two senses of parasite-just as noise has a constitutive function in communication, a parasite has a constitutive function in the social or biological organism it inhabits. By means of disorder, the parasite infuses the system with a new order.
Kurekhin's aesthetic approach was to always occupy and cultivate the position of a parasite, who, having infi ltrated the system, introduced noise into its authoritative channels of communication. His goal was not to ridicule the system but to give it a new, unfamiliar, way of looking at itself. In this way, he offered the kind of "positive construction" for which he had argued.
This understanding helps to clarify Kurekhin's intentions in the Dugin affair. Kurekhin, I believe, was neither seriously promoting Dugin's ideas nor ridiculing them. He focused on Dugin because the post-Soviet liberal intelligentsia was unanimously hostile to him. By overidentifying with Dugin's illiberal rhetoric, and by doing this through mass forms of communication (in the propaganda materials he devised for Dugin's election campaign, in meetings with the electorate, in the Pop-Mekhanika performance), Kurekhin provoked the moral outrage of the liberal intelligentsia. This outrage revealed the latter's Romantic attachment to the concepts of "freedom" and "democracy" (key terms in the discourse of the time), with each understood as a timeless, ahistorical value, disconnected from concrete contexts (such as the market). Blinded by this Romantic view, the liberal intelligentsia was unable to recognize a fact that would become obvious a few years later: that the post-Soviet advent of freedom had actually contributed to the production of new forms of unfreedom-particularly the mass impoverishment brought about by the neoliberal reforms of "shock therapy." As Kurekhin put it: "At fi rst there was a feeling that the era of freedom was ascending. Then freedom arrived. But freedom is a dangerous thing." 60 Many artists who collaborated with Kurekhin suspected that his support of Dugin was a provocation. Two of them even argued that the political campaign was "another version of his Lenin-mushroom [provocation]." By convincing Dugin to run for offi ce in St. Petersburg, "where no one knew him and where most people supported democrats . . . Kurekhin tricked him." 61 The result was Dugin's complete and utter fl op at the elec-Slavic Review tions. Years later, Dugin himself noted: "Kurekhin was interested in . . . Eurasianism very ironically, with internal irony, if you will. But that irony was not obvious to those who surrounded him, because in that society this topic was taboo." 62 Several years after Kurekhin's untimely death, Russian intellectuals began to develop a much more critical view of neoliberal reform. Some of the arguments that Kurekhin had articulated in his "support" of Dugin in 1995, all of which had at the time been branded "extremist," ended up in the mainstream of intellectual and political discourse. Among these was his claim that Russia needed to have a viable national idea and that this idea would be different from the one in the west.
As with Kurekhin's Dugin affair, considering the criticism that was directed at the Lenin-mushroom program will help us identify what this program ultimately managed to achieve. Dmitrii Galkovskii wrote that the program reduced Lenin from a dictator to a benign joke, averting public criticism from the "communist regime" and making the trial of the Communist Party unlikely. 63 "Of course one may also laugh," argued Galkovskii. "There was much comical in Lenin. But only MAY and only ALSO, as in a free supplement or a cartoon on the last page of a newspaper. But when there is nothing else apart from that, when in the center there are short chuckles, while all over the country there are still monuments on various Lenin Avenues, then, dear sirs, who are you laughing at?" 64 Although Galkovskii's critique was made from a liberal position, it paralleled, almost verbatim, the attacks on Kurekhin from antiliberal camps. Writing in the nationalist Russkii kurЈ er, the poet Konstantin Kedrov described Kurekhin's provocation as an example of insidious postmodernism that holds no values and ideals dear, including the moral foundations of the socialist past: "For a long time all of you have been living in a postmodernist world. They promised you communism and then capitalism, but you ended up in typical postmodernism." 65 Both Galkovskii and Kedrov, in other words, thought that Kurekhin's hoax undermined an essential moral canon of life, without which good and evil could not be measured. The very fact that Kurekhin's treatment of the Soviet system could be identically criticized from two supposedly opposite positions points to the deep paradox within that system, a paradox that Kurekhin's program itself had intended to make visible. What was this paradox?
Before perestroika, political discourse was party-run and adhered to strict forms. The literal meanings of communist ideology were beyond
